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Interpretable Machine 
Learning for Privacy-
Preserving Pervasive 
Systems 
Our everyday interactions with pervasive systems 
generate traces that capture various aspects of 
human behavior and enable machine learning 
algorithms to extract latent information about users. In 
this paper, we propose a machine learning 
interpretability framework that enables users to understand how these generated traces 
violate their privacy.  
With the emergence of connected devices (e.g., smartphones and smartmeters), pervasive sys-
tems generate growing amounts of digital traces as users undergo their everyday activities. These 
traces are crucial to service providers to understand their customers, to increase the degree of 
personalization, and enhance the quality of their services. For instance, personal digital traces 
stemming from public transit smartcards help transportation providers understand the commuting 
patterns of users; the usage statistics of home appliances can be used to improve energy effi-
ciency; on-street cameras provide police officers with new ways of investigating crimes; content 
generated through mobile and wearables (e.g., posts in online social media or GPS running 
routes in specialized websites such as those for fitness) can be used to provide tailored content to 
individuals; bank transaction logs can be used to spot unusual activity in accounts.  
However, sharing these digital traces generated by pervasive systems with service providers 
might raise concerns with regards to user privacy, as the processing and analysis of these traces 
can surface latent information about user behaviors. Using machine learning techniques, third 
parties such as advertisers can identify a single individual from inadequately aggregated datasets 
shared by service providers either publicly or privately. The common use of ad libraries inte-
grated directly in applications and websites further allows advertisers to collect the same raw 
traces as the service providers, and infer personal information about users, which can infringe on 
the users’ privacy. In the case of location tracking libraries, these traces might reveal information 
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about the significant places routinely visited by users, which allows to infer a wide range of per-
sonal information, including the user's place of residence and work and their future locations.  
The main focus of the existing work has been on the performance and interpretability of the tech-
niques to infer personal information and identify users from their digital traces (e.g., Kosinski et 
al. [1]). In particular, there has been a large interest to improve the intelligibility of machine 
learning models to various audiences, mainly by giving effective and intelligible explanations of 
the inference task and model to the user [2] [3]. As a result, the explanations must provide an in-
telligible representation to the users about what the model knows and how it knows it. With the 
rise of adversarial and linking attacks on machine learning models, these explanations are im-
portant to guarantee the fairness and accountability of the models to the users [4]. Some works 
have studied the privacy impact of the specific models and proposed methods to improve their 
interpretability in terms of privacy by allowing the user to adapt the learning and inference algo-
rithms according to their own privacy preferences [5]. However, there have been limited work in 
relation to how these inference techniques may infringe the user privacy with the personal infor-
mation they expose. In addition to legal requirements [6], the need for the interpretability 
through effective explanation of the learning and inference process leading to certain predictions 
is twofold: (i) it helps users understand why their privacy has been violated, and (ii) it enables 
users to trust the model's predictions and recommendations to take the necessary actions to pro-
tect their privacy in the future. 
In this paper, we discuss the challenges related to the design of an interpretability framework 
with the goal of supporting interpretation of machine learning techniques that are adopted to in-
fringe the privacy of individuals through personal data inference and user identification. Our 
contributions are threefold. We state the interpretability and privacy requirements of an effective 
interpretability framework for privacy-preserving pervasive systems before detailing the func-
tionalities of its components, with a focus on feature selection methods as they are crucial when 
it comes to present the explanations to the users. We present a case study where we detail a pro-
totype framework that relies on machine learning classifiers with the goal of identifying users 
from samples of their personal digital traces. Finally, we present the open challenges in this area, 
discussing a potential research agenda for collaboration across the pervasive computing, human-
computer interaction, and machine learning communities. 
TOWARDS A PRIVACY-ORIENTED 
INTEPRETABILITY FRAMEWORK FOR PERVASIVE 
SYSTEMS  
Privacy Requirements for Digital Trace Inference 
Interpretability  
The main goal of the proposed interpretability privacy framework is to automatically generate 
explanations of inference tasks on personal data such that end-users have a better understanding 
of the privacy risks and implications of these tasks. The explanations should be helpful to the 
end-users so that they have an understanding on how the underlying machine learning model 
works and behaves depending on the inputs (i.e., the data provided by the end-user). User under-
standing is fundamental, as it improves the trust and acceptance of predictions and recommenda-
tions given by the model. Further, having a complete mental model of the inference task has 
been shown to be effective to enable users to better understand the different privacy and security 
threats [7]. In this section, we present the different requirements concerning the design of a pri-
vacy-oriented interpretability framework for machine learning techniques applied to digital 
traces analysis and inference. Several user studies have been conducted in order to determine the 
main requirements of explanations about machine learning models and their predictions given to 
users [2] [3] [5] [7]. 
The requirements are usually studied from a usability perspective which revolves around user-
centric approaches [8]. In particular, researchers and practitioners focus on the so-called gulf of 
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evaluation, i.e., the gap between representations that can be directly perceived and interpreted by 
a user provided by a system and her/his expectations and intentions. Another key aspect consid-
ered in usability studies is the gulf of execution, i.e., the gap between a user’s goal related to a 
specific action and the means to execute that goal. While the main requirements focus on ad-
dressing both the gulf of evaluation and the gulf of execution, we argue the case for an additional 
privacy requirement necessary to provide private explanations. We support the choice of the re-
quirements by providing examples through a discussion of a case study we will present later in 
the paper. The scenario of the case study describes a machine learning interpretability privacy 
framework that provides interpretations for inference of personal information from location 
traces.  
Model understanding (Gulf of evaluation). There is a general agreement in the community that 
the explanations given to users should help them have an understanding of the inference task and 
model, in particular to raise the awareness of the different privacy threats of the inference task. 
More specifically, the explanations should provide two levels of understanding to users:  
• Why: The explanations should help users understand individual decisions and predic-
tions given by the model with respect to specific inputs. As so, instance-based explana-
tions justify the output of the model, that is providing the reason why a specific decision 
or prediction was given to the end-user. This justification should address the gap be-
tween the users’ intentions and their perceived functionality of the system. In the case of 
our interpretability privacy framework for personal information inference, the frame-
work should provide the users with an explanation justifying why the personal infor-
mation was inferred.  
• How: The explanation should give the users a comprehensive understanding of the 
overall machine learning model when possible. Indeed, explaining deep learning algo-
rithms such as Convolutional Neural Networks is still an open problem. Global expla-
nations should provide users with a conceptual representation of the model and provide 
an intuition of how it works. Therefore, an essential requirement consists in detailing the 
main components at the basis of the learning process, in order to help the user under-
stand and identify the privacy threats of the model.  
Model interactions (Gulf of execution). Once the user has a general understanding of how the 
model works, they should be able to control and interact with it. In particular, we believe that the 
explanations should address two following interaction forms, also known as counterfactual ex-
planations [3]. These explanations can be subject to probing attacks that aim to perturb the 
model features. 
• What If: Understanding how the model behaves depending on different inputs or condi-
tions enables the users to learn how the overall system works. In the case of the inter-
pretability privacy framework for personal information inference, users should be able 
to determine which information can be inferred depending on the available location in-
formation. 
• How To: Providing explanations and recommendations to the users allows them to have 
an understanding of which inputs and conditions to change in order to achieve expected 
predictions or decisions. In the case of the interpretability privacy framework, users may 
want to know how to prevent any personal information from being disclosed, which 
would require, for example, the framework to give recommendations on the places and 
times they should avoid visiting because they may reveal information that was not sup-
posed to be disclosed.  
Privacy-preserving explanations. When presented to the end-users, the explanations must have 
specific privacy requirements, in particular, they must preserve the privacy of other users. Since 
explanations rely on a collection of individual data points or features, they can expose personal 
information of other users whose digital traces are used to train the inference models. This re-
quirement poses a challenge, as both of the two above requirements may involve exposing a sub-
set of traces from other users to the person who requested the explanation. A possible solution 
consists in privacy-preserving techniques that can be used to obfuscate or aggregate the infor-
mation about other users. In the case of the interpretability framework, the explanation that de-
tails why personal information was inferred or how the user can be uniquely identified should 
  
  
exclude information about other individual users. In particular, the explanation should not pre-
sent a user’s digital trace that can lead back to the single user who generated it.  
Overview of the Interpretability Privacy Framework  
We present an overview of the interpretability privacy framework that addresses the three main 
requirements presented in the previous section. The framework relies on a distributed architec-
ture, which is depicted in Figure 1. The architecture consists of: (i) a privacy-preserving backend 
and (ii) a client that relies on a privacy-preserving library and a series of application plug-ins in-
stalled on the end-user’s device (e.g., their smartphones) acts as a proxy between the device and 
the service providers. The distributed architecture implements different components, detailed in 
the following, that enable users to make informed decisions about sharing their traces that could 
contain latent personal information.  
Inference component. The inference component is in charge of inferring latent personal infor-
mation about a user from their digital traces. This component is implemented in the privacy-pre-
serving backend in order to optimize its performance. The inference component leverages a 
machine learning model trained with the set of digital traces generated by a large number of us-
ers stored in the anonymized data storage. The extent of digital traces generated by users is broad 
and includes pervasive system traces (e.g., smart meters), location traces (e.g., public transit 
smartcards or check-ins made on location-based social networks), and on-line activity. The ma-
chine learning model of the inference component is specific to the inference task at hand and 
consists of a classification model that infers personal information such as activity and personal 
traits from the traces alone. Additionally, the component can further identify the most likely user 
who could have generated a set of points given as input. In particular, given a set of inputs, the 
inference task outputs predictions, which consist in a set of activities and personal traits associ-
ated with their respective likelihood of belonging to that activity or trait, as well as associated 
metadata, that is the set of per-user intermediate computation steps involved in the execution of 
the inference task. The inferred pattern or trait will be the one with the maximum likelihood.  
Explanation component. The explanation component provides an interface for supporting user 
interactions and is implemented on the client (for example as an independent application or 
through a library used by application developers). End-users send queries of pre-defined types to 
this component, which in turn, translates them into tasks carried out by the remote inference 
component. The explanation component then retrieves the prediction outputs and metadata of the 
inference task and provides information about the privacy risk in an intelligible manner. The ex-
planation component should select relevant input features that consist of the user personal digital 
traces. As we will detail in the following section, the selected features depend on the classifier 
implemented by the inference component, as well as the domain expertise of the end-user. In or-
der to address the model understanding requirement, the explanation component should also de-
tail the intermediate computation steps involved in the execution of the inference task, given in 
the prediction metadata. Furthermore, as discussed in the previous section, the explanation com-
ponent must allow interactions with the end-users. As per the privacy requirement, end-users in-
terested in getting information about their current privacy state and recommendations on possible 
actions that could affect their privacy state only access to the digital traces they have generated.  
Privacy-preserving component. This component leverages state-of-the-art privacy-preserving 
techniques such as differential privacy to share anonymized user traces from the user’s device to 
the remote data store. The goal of this component is to achieve privacy-preserving explanations 
as detailed above. In particular, with differential privacy, this component can share the user 
traces and introduce a minimum amount of probabilistic noise in the traces to guarantee a good 
trade-off between privacy and utility when it comes to use the traces with the inference compo-
nent [9]. The privacy budget controls the level of privacy provided by the privacy-preserving 
component. It depends on the service provided, the type of personal information being inferred 
and the privacy preferences of the user. This results in a user-controllable privacy system, where 
the user is in charge of finding their optimal trade-off between the level of privacy and the utility 
of the service. In the case of location data, the component can introduce a certain amount of 
noise such that users only provide their approximate location. As so, the raw user traces will re-
main on the user’s device until the user makes a decision about sharing their traces or not. This 
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component is necessary in our architecture to guarantee the full anonymity of the traces collected 
from all the users to perform the inference task.  
 
Figure 1. Interpretable Machine Learning for Privacy-Preserving Pervasive Systems. (1) Our client 
is installed on the user’s device. The privacy-preserving component of the client then analyzes the 
raw, user-generated content (e.g., Facebook post). (2) In turn, the privacy-preserving component 
client sends the trace in an anonymized way to the remote data storage. (3) The inference 
component then predicts some personal information from the anonymized traces, using the user’s 
traces as well as other users’. (4) The prediction is returned to the explanation component, in 
charge of presenting the inferred personal information to the user. (5) The explanation allows for an 
informed decision about sharing personal information by allowing the user to share or not to share 
the trace with the service provider. (6) If the user chooses to share the trace knowing the privacy 
implications, the client will share the raw trace with the service provider.  
Implementation of the explanation component with 
privacy risk and model-dependent feature selection  
The goal of the explanation component is to present to the end-user the privacy risk of sharing 
personal digital traces. The privacy risk corresponds the level of confidence an inference task is 
able to determine a given personal information from a user trace. To this end, the explanation 
component computes a score corresponding to the privacy risk based on the input user-generated 
features and inference metadata. While the presentation of this information to the users is an 
open research problem [3], possible solutions include numerical scales and the use of visual ele-
ments. However, presenting all the features and the metadata would be overwhelming for the 
user and could hinder the understanding of the model [10].  As such, we argue that the explana-
tion component must select the most relevant features, which, together, contribute the most to 
the particular inference task requested by the user. We believe that feature selection is the most 
suitable way for providing an explanation of the inference task [11]. The feature selection 
method depends on the underlying machine learning model used for the inference component 
and can be divided into three broad categories [12]. Each method gives a score to the features 
such that low-scoring features have a low relevance with respect to the other features and should 
be omitted when presenting an explanation to the end-users. In Table 1 we summarize the differ-
ent feature selection methods and the different classification models implemented in various the 
  
  
inference components of the literature. Note that our approach is model-dependent, which con-
trasts with model-agnostic approaches which are limited to instance-based explanations, allow-
ing end-users to only understand why a certain prediction was made. Contrary to this latter 
approach, our model-dependent approach allows us to provide global explanations of how the 
whole model works. 
Table 1. Feature selection methods according to the inference component  
used in the literature.  
Inference  
component 
Explanation method 	
for inference  
Potential 	
applications 
Cluster matching Feature rank through 	
entropy measure.  
Home activity inference from meter 
traces [13].  
Demographic inference from digital  
personal traces [14]. 
Linear  
regression  
Feature rank through coeffi-
cients.  
Trait and interest inference [1]. 
Logistic  
regression  
Feature ranking through the 
results of maximum likeli-
hood estimation.  
Trait and interest inference [1]. 
Naïve Bayes  Feature rank through Infor-
mation Gain, RelieF 
weights, or likelihoods.  
Behavior-based identification [15]. 
Modality-based identification [16]. 
Multinomial Naïve 
Bayes  
Feature rank through likeli-
hoods and accuracy gain.  
Location-based identification [17]. 
Nearest Neighbors  Feature rank through near-
est neighbor distances.  
Indoor location inference [18]. 
Linear Support Vec-
tor Machine  
Feature rank through sup-
port vector weights.  
Behavior-based identification [15]. 
Decision Trees Feature rank through Infor-
mation Gain or tree level 
and frequency. 
Behavior-based identification [15]. 
Random Forest  Feature rank through Gini 
importance or Information 
Gain. 
Behavior-based identification [15]. 
CASE STUDY  
In this section, we present a case study as an application of our interpretability privacy frame-
work to the problem of personal information prediction from check-in traces such as those used 
by apps like Swarm/Foursquare using a Multinomial Naïve Bayes classifier [17]. This use case 
warns users about the privacy implications of a potential check-in, i.e., about the predictability of 
given personal information from a sequence of their location. 
Without loss of generality, the inference task will give some personal information about a user 
such as their political opinion, gender, or religious beliefs. Each personal information has an ar-
bitrary number of classes F = {f1, ..., fm}, for instance in the case of political views, there are two 
high-level classes f1 and f2 that correspond to liberal and conservative, respectively. 
The Multinomial Naïve Bayes classifier computes the probability that a given input (i.e., a set of 
check-ins given by the end-user {c1, ..., cn}) has of being associated to a certain output (i.e., a 
personal information class fi). The output with the highest probability becomes the predicted la-
bel for the input.  
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We use u to indicate a single user in the collection of all active Foursquare users U, ci to repre-
sent a single check-in as part of the set of check-ins C = {c1, ..., cn} given by a user, and f to rep-
resent a personal information class associated to a user among F = {f1, ..., fm}. A check-in is 
represented by the tuple (user identifier ui, user personal information fi, location identifier li). A 
training set containing the check-ins associated with the personal information of the Foursquare 
users is fed to the classifier. The inference task consists in determining the correct user personal 
information f⋆ such that it maximizes the following product of the likelihood that each check-in 
belongs to a user personal information class:  
𝑓⋆ = argmax)∈𝑭𝑃(𝑓)/𝑃( 𝑐1 ∣ 𝑓 ).4156  
We consider the case of potential personal information prediction from a set of n unlabeled 
check-ins C* = {𝑐6∗, ..., 𝑐4∗} using the interpretability privacy framework we described in the pre-
vious sections. The check-in sequence is sent to the explanation component, which queries the 
inference component to determine the most likely personal information class of the Foursquare 
user who could have generated the check-ins. More specifically, the inference component trans-
mits the individual check-in likelihoods P(𝑐1∗| f) for each check-in 𝑐1∗ of C* and each user per-
sonal information class f in the training set. Using this data, the explanation component then 
presents the explanation of the result of the inference task to the end-user.  
We represent an example explanation presented by the framework to the end-user in Figure 2 
with labeled Foursquare check-ins collected by Yang et al. [19]. Figure 2 shows a possible visu-
alization of the privacy risk using both numerical and chromatic scales. As discussed above, the 
presentation of this information is an open research challenge, in particular with respect to the 
explanation of the underlying personal information prediction algorithm. The figure includes sta-
tistical information about the user personal information in terms of likelihood, which can be use-
ful to domain expert users, but might be confusing for lay, non-expert users. The explanation 
further provides a clear recommendation as to whether the user should check-in or not at a given 
location by estimating the relevance of the new check-in with respect to their current personal 
information predictability. In the figure, it is apparent that check-in 𝑐8 incurs a higher risk than 
the other check-ins to inferring personal information 𝐹8. As we discussed in the previous section, 
the relevance of an input feature, here a check-in, can be estimated through feature selection 
methods, in this case, by ranking them according to their likelihoods. 
  
  
 
Figure 2. Example of an explanation of a personal information prediction task presented to a 
Foursquare user from the five unlabeled check-ins C* = {C1, C2, C3, C4, C5} among personal 
information classes F = {F1, F2} represented in the figure. In this case, the task explains the 
personal information prediction F1 to the end-user by presenting the check-ins with a higher privacy 
risk. 
OPEN RESEARCH CHALLENGES AND OUTLOOK  
In this section, we detail the research challenges related to the interpretation and privacy implica-
tions of personal information inference tasks from traces generated from the interaction with per-
vasive systems.  
Information selection. By default, the model is seen as a black box with a set of inputs and out-
puts. Predictions alone and metrics based on them do not suffice to characterize and explain the 
model [2]. While this information is limited, knowing the internals of the model would allow 
system designers to present relevant information that was learned by the model during its train-
ing. The challenge is to determine the amount of information an explanation component should 
present to users so that they have an understanding of how the model works [2] and what the pri-
vacy risks of sharing their data are. This includes determining which features to select and pre-
sent to the users in order to avoid to give an overwhelming quantity of information, which could 
result in very complex set of explanations with limited intelligibility. Indeed, while extreme sim-
plicity is not acceptable for users, giving too much information to the user can be overwhelming 
and will decrease the quality of the explanation. For complex models, such as deep learning 
models, it may be difficult to understand the features and provide a clear explanation to the end-
user. In this case, counterfactual explanations or model-agnostic approaches can provide a better 
solution [3]. With large resulting feature sets, the challenge is to find semantically meaningful 
feature spaces for given inference tasks. In this case, the use of PCA or SVD could effectively 
provide lower-dimensional feature sets to be presented to the user. 
Level of expertise of the end-users. The explanation presented to the users must consider the 
level of domain expertise of the user, and in particular, the quantity and complexity of infor-
mation contained in the explanation. As such, an expert user requires extensive explanations, 
whereas a non-expert user will need simple explanations with a limited amount of information. 
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The challenge consists in determining the appropriate the level of detail to present to the user. A 
possible experimental strategy is to conduct user studies in order to allow researchers and practi-
tioners to determine the necessary and sufficient amount of information [2], [5]. The definition 
of the methodology of these studies is another open challenge per se the interpretable machine 
learning community as discussed below. The challenge is that user studies might be very specific 
to the particular inference techniques and it might be difficult to extract general conclusions from 
them [2]. 
Definition of privacy-preserving interpretation and anonymity. When presenting an explana-
tion, sensitive information about other users may be disclosed by the information given in the 
explanation. The explanation given to a user cannot compromise or expose information about 
other individuals whose data is contained in the training set of the machine learning model. The 
explanations can rely on obfuscation techniques such as differential privacy [9] to hide infor-
mation about other users when presenting an explanation. Alternatively, aggregation methods 
might guarantee a certain level of anonymity with respect to the trace of other users. However, 
presenting privacy recommendations to users to help them better protect their privacy requires 
explanations that contain information about other individuals. This task is particularly challeng-
ing, as it requires presenting the general patterns associated to an individual, without revealing 
the specific patterns associated to other users.  
Recommendations and data shift. Giving explanations to the users allows them to understand 
why their privacy can be violated. With recommendations, users can take actions on their future 
behavior to further protect their privacy. This task is challenging for the following reasons. First, 
the user must trust the system to follow the recommendation. Effective explanations of the infer-
ence task helps increasing user trust in the recommendations. Second, the recommendation given 
to a specific user depends on the expected future behavior of the other users, as well as whether 
they follow the recommendations that they received to protect their privacy. As a result, giving 
recommendations to users may change their behavior and routines, which may in turn invalidate 
the current training set. This problem is referred to as the data shift problem [20]. A solution 
consists in training the model again using recently generated traces, but this might not be always 
possible in practical situations.  
Evaluation of the explanations. When giving automatically generated explanations to users, we 
need a methodology to evaluate the explanation interpretability in terms of effectiveness and fi-
delity of the inference model with respect to the quality of the model understanding and interac-
tion as well as the level of privacy provided (see the privacy requirements we stated in the 
previous section). Since interpretability depends on a human judgment, it is subjective and de-
pends on the background and level of expertise of the evaluator. Qualitative evaluation is then 
necessary and can be performed through user studies or surveys. In this case, the challenge is to 
design a methodology to test and assess the subjective comprehensibility of the explanation with 
user studies by choosing the right set of users, including expert users and non-expert users. One 
way of carrying out the evaluation would be to present different explanation framing strategies to 
different end-users, using for example A/B testing. In particular, it is important to determine the 
performance metrics used to reliably evaluate the explanation. For instance, trust in the explana-
tion is a common metric that is highly subjective. While qualitative evaluations are necessary, an 
interesting research question is how to perform systematic quantitative evaluation of explana-
tions given target performance metrics, without the involvement of users [10]. 
We believe that addressing these research challenges will be possible only through the collabora-
tion of researchers from different communities, including, but not limited to, pervasive compu-
ting, human-computer interaction, data visualization and machine learning.  
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